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applied to the KSD discharge, nor whether the rule was within the EPA's authority.
Finally, the Court compared the KSD-Klamnath River transfer to L.A.
County and South Florida Water Management Dis&ict v. Miccosukee Tribe.
Like the riverbed in L.A. County,the KSD is an improved version of a natural
waterway that previously existed. Further, the water that the KSD transfers into
the Klamath River originated in that river. The last point the Court made is that
if the Bureau removed the pumps and headgates it placed in the 1940s the Klamath Straits would convey water between the Klamath River and Lower Klamath Lake, finalizing the argument that the waters are not meaningfully distinct.
The Court emphasized this point because whether the CWA required the Bureau to obtain a permit turned on whether the two water bodies were meaningfully distinct.
Accordingly, the court affinned the sununary judgment in favor of the Bureau.
Josh Oden
STATE COURTS
ARIZONA
Arizona Dep't. of Water Res. v. McClennen, 360 P.3d 1023 (Ariz. 2015)
(holding that: (i) Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 45-172 provides the only grounds for
which the Arizona Department of Water Resources can deny an application for
severance and transfer of a water right; and (ii) the statute defines "interested
persons" as those with interests protected by § 45-172 and whose rights the
transfer would affect).
In 2010, Freeport Minerals Corporation ("Freeport") sent applications to
the Arizona Department of Water Resources ("ADWR") to sever water rights
from Planet Ranch in Mohave County and transfer them to a wellfield near
Wikieup. The proposed transfer would not physically remove any water, but
rather it would give Freeport the right to use water for mining and municipal
uses without losing priority.
Freeport previously entered into settlement agreements with the Arizona
Game and Fish Department, the Hualapai Tribe, and the Department of the
Interior, which Congress approved in the Bill Willians River Water Rights Settlement Act of 2014 ("Act"). The Act was scheduled to expire in December
2015 if Freeport failed to fulfill certain conditions, including the ADWR granting Freeport's applications.
Upon receiving Freeport's applications, the ADWR published notice in
numerous Mohave County newspapers stating 'any interested person' could file
a written obection. Mohave County ("County") filed an objection to Freeport's
applications, arguing that the transfer would affect the county's water supply,
increase taxes, and was against the public interest. The ADWR rejected the
County's arguments, finding that the county did not have an affected water right.
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Additionally, the ADWR concluded it was not authorized to deny the applications on the basis it would cause an increase in tax burdens to residents or it
would be against public interest. An administrative law judge upheld the
ADWR's decision finding that none of the County's objections were based on
the "limitations and conditions" enumerated in Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 45-172.
In December 2014, the County filed an appeal in superior court, which
vacated the ADWR's final decision in June 2015. Freeport and the ADWR
filed appeals with the Arizona Court of Appeals and moved to transfer the case
to the Supreme Court of Arizona ("Court"). The Court granted the petition for
special action.
The Court first addressed whether the ADWR had authority to deny severance and transfer applications for reasons other than those listed in the statute. Section 45-172(A) provides: "la] water right may be severed from the land
to which it is appurtenant... land] may be transferred for use... without losing
priority theretofore established, subject to the following limitations and conditions." One such limitation is that the ADWR director must publish notice of
applications in a newspaper in the county where the drainage or watershed lies.
The published notice must include that any interested person may file written
objections within thirty days from the last day of published notice.
In construing this statute, the Court analyzed legislative intent. The statute
identifies specific limits or conditions in approving water rights transfers. The
Court found that the ADWR's review of an application is a "licensing decision,"
which prohibits the ADWR from basing its decision on any condition not specifically authorized by the statute.
The County argued that the ADVWR has discretion under § 45-172(A) to
consider other factors because the statute says water rights "may" be severed
and transferred. However, the Court found "may" to refer to the ability to sever
and transfer the water right. The Court reasoned that interpreting "may" to
allow the ADWR broad discretion to deny an application overlooks the rest of
the sentence stating "subject to the following limitations and conditions." The
County cited various statutes purportedly supporting that the ADVVR could
deny applications for reasons not listed in § 45-172(A), but the Court found
them unconvincing. Thus, the Court found the ADWR did not abuse its discretion in denying the County's objections, which were not listed in § 45-172(A).
The Court next addressed whether the County qualified as an "interested
person" entitled to file objections to the transfer and severance applications.
Because the phrase "any interested person" is ambiguous, the Court found it
was subject to more than one meaning.
The County first argued that the Court should interpret the phrase "any
interested person" as anyone having an interest or concern about the transfer
and severance of water rights. The Court found this interpretation would allow
almost anyone to file objections, rendering the word "interested" essentially
meaningless. The Court specifically noted that words should not be construed
in isolation, but rather taken together in context.
Read in context, the Court construed the phrase "any interested person" to
mean any person having a statutorily protected interest that would be affected
by the application for proposed transfer and severance. The Court concluded
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the County was not an "interested person" entitled to file an objection in this
case because it had no such protected interest.
Second, the County contended that "interested persons" should encompass
more than those persons who have existing water rights because the statute requires the director to give notice of the applications. The County reasoned that
if "interested persons" were only those having an interest protected by statute,
it could send notice directly to those persons, rather than circulating notice in a
newspaper. The Court found this argument unpersuasive because publication
requirements are not inconsistent with imposing limitations on who may file
objections.
Third, the County argued it qualified as an "interested person" because approval of the severance and transfer would cause it injury. Specifically, the severance would increase tax burdens on county residents and could negatively
affect water supplies. The Court found that this argument improperly conflated
standing, which requires plaintiffs to allege sufficient injury in order to appear
in court.
Fourth, the County claimed that the ADWR must first consult with the
County before deciding on applications under Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 11-269.09(A).
The County also contended it has an obligation under Ariz. Rev. State § 11-804
to protect water resources in the county. The Court found neither statute applied.
Last, the County argued the Court should construe § 45-172(A) liberally to
"promote the ends of justice." The County cited Aimer v. Superior Court,in
which the Court adopted this approach when interpreting the phrase "party
beneficially interested." Finding that "any interested person" was not synonymous with the phrase "party beneficially interested," the Court declined to
adopt this approach.
Accordingly, the Court vacated the superior court judgment and affirmed
the ADWR's final decision.
Kelly Ledoux

COLORADO
In the Matter of Water Rights, 361 P.3d 392 (Colo. 2015) (holding that: (i)
the Colorado Ground Water Commission had jurisdiction to make the initial
determination of whether the water at issue was designated ground water; and
(ii) a portion of the stomn runoff water at issue was "designated ground water"
under the Groundwater Management Act, rather than surface water).
The Colorado Ground Water Commission ("Commission") held hearings
in 1967 and 1968 in order to resolve the proper designation of a ground water
basin in the Upper Black Squirrel Creek Basin ("Basin"). It found that "'virtually all' of the water in the basin was underground water, and water flowed on
the surface only 'during and immediately following' periods of heavy rainfall
from summer storns." The water was also not adjacent to a continuously flowing natural stream and would never reach a tributary system. As such, the Commission determined that the Basin qualified as a designated ground water basin,

